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ABSTRACT
In this paper we present the Sampling Privacy mechanism for pri-
vately releasing personal data. Sampling Privacy is a sampling based
privacy mechanism that satisfies differential privacy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Publicly releasing data with exact answers to queries (without saniti-
zation) has incurred numerous privacy violations and attacks relating
to unintentional medical data disclosure of high profile governors [1],
shutdowns of seemingly innocuous open data machine learning com-
petitions [2], and unintentional sharing of mobility patterns of high
profile US citizens with foreign governments [3]. k-anonymity in-
troduced by Sweeney in 1998 [1] was among the first privacy tech-
niques to address publicly releasing data in a privacy-preserving
manner. Roughly speaking, k-anonymity seeks to blend a single data
owner’s personal attribute with at least k other data owners such
that the single data owner is indistinguishable from k−1 other data
owners. For example, if a particular data owner’s record reporting a
particular disease is publicly released with 1000 other data owners
records with the same disease, the data owner is indistinguishable
from 999 other data owners.
However, there are known impossibility results for attempts to
preserve privacy while releasing exact answers. Dinnur and Nissim
showed in 2003 that it is impossible to reveal exact aggregation
information while simultaneously preserving privacy (against a poly-
nomial adversary) [4]. Thus, perturbation must be injected in order to
guarantee privacy (privacy defined as an adversary is unable to deter-
mine the value of a targeted individual with a probability greater than
50%) [4]. The implication is there will be some notion of absolute
error due to the required perturbation.
In this paper, our goal is to achieve the notion of scalable privacy.
That is, as the population increases the privacy should strengthen.
Additionally, the absolute error should remain at worst constant. For
example, suppose we are interested in understanding a link between
eating red meat and heart disease. We start by querying a small
population of say 100 and ask “Do you eat red meat and have heart
disease?". Suppose 85 truthfully respond “Yes". If we know that
someone participated in this particular study, we can reasonably infer
they eat red meat and have heart disease regardless the answer. Thus,
it is difficult to maintain privacy when the majority of the population
truthfully responds “Yes".
Querying a larger and diverse population would protect the data
owners that eat red meat and have heart disease. Let’s say we query
a population of 100,000 and it turns out that 99.9% of the population
is vegetarian. In this case, the vegetarians blend with and provide
privacy protection of the red meat eaters. However, we must be
careful when performing estimation of a minority population to
ensure the sampling error does not destroy the underlying estimate.
Differential privacy is one such privacy definition which cap-
tures this concept of perturbation while preserving accuracy and has
emerged as the gold standard [5, 6]. Roughly speaking, differential
privacy says that a query against two databases which differ by at
most one row is ε indistinguishable (where ε is the acceptable pri-
vacy leakage). Thus, a data owner is able to safely participate in
sharing their personal data, as there is minimal risk that personal
information will be leaked.
A popular technique which satisfies differential privacy is the ran-
domized response mechanism, originally proposed in the 1960s [7,
8]. Randomized response is used by many companies today (e.g., Ap-
ple, Google [9]) due to its simplicity while satisfying the differential
privacy guarantee.
The randomized response mechanism perturbs the truthful answer
by having the data owner flip two biased coins (e.g., two indepen-
dent Bernoulli trials) [7, 8]. The randomized response mechanism
proceeds as follows. The data owner flips the first coin. If the first
coin comes up heads, answer truthfully. Else flip the second coin
and answer “Yes" if heads and “No" if tails. The perturbation is per-
formed by the data owner (induced by the coin flips), as opposed to
trusting a centralized service to perturb the truthful response. Estima-
tion occurs by aggregating the privatized responses, subtracting the
expected value of the second coin toss, and then finally dividing by
the probability of the first coin toss. For example, suppose the coin
tosses are configured independently with f lip1 = 0.85, f lip2 = 0.3
and 100 data owners. The coin toss parameters are published publicly
while the number of data owners is private and needs to be estimated.
We estimate by aggregating the privatized responses from all data
owners, subtracting the expected value of 1−0.85×0.3×100 and
dividing by 0.8 1.
However, a drawback to the randomized response mechanism is
that the estimation error quickly increases with the population size
due to the underlying truthful distribution distortion. For example,
say we are interested in how many vehicles are at a popular stretch
of the highway. Say we configure f lip1 = 0.85 and f lip2 = 0.3. We
query 10,000 vehicles asking for their current location and only 100
vehicles are at the particular area we are interested in (i.e., 1% of the
population truthfully responds “Yes"). The standard deviation due to
the privacy noise will be 21 2 which is slightly tolerable. However, a
query over one million vehicles (now only 0.01% of the population
truthfully responds “Yes") will incur a standard deviation of 212.
The estimate of the ground truth (100) will incur a large absolute
error when the aggregated privatized responses are two or even three
standard deviations (i.e., 95% or 99% of the time) away from the
expected value, as the mechanism subtracts only the expected value
of the noise.
1For instance with a 60% truthful population, the answer to the first toss is 0.6×0.85 =
0.51 and the answer to the second toss is 1−0.85×0.3 = 0.045
2(
√
1−0.85×0.3×10,000)
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Some protocols which leverage the randomized response mecha-
nism have made assumptions that the underlying truthful population
is fixed at 2/3 or 3/4 of the total population in order to preserve
accuracy. However, it’s not clear what privacy guarantees will be
provided as any adversary is able to successfully guess with greater
than 50% probability the value of any data owner in such a popu-
lation. For example, suppose our query is how many home owners
reside within 15 blocks from the beach, yet we ask only those home
owners within 20 blocks from the beach.
The Laplace mechanism was introduced as a way to add privacy
noise independent of the database size [6] by drawing privacy noise
from the Laplace distribution. The Laplace mechanism is calibrated
to the max difference between any two rows in the database. That is,
the noise is sufficient to protect the max leakage that any particular
data owner induces. For example, first a service aggregates all the
data owners truthful responses. Then, the service draws from the
Laplace distribution by calibrating the variance according to the
desired privacy strength. Drawing from other distributions such
as Gaussian also satisfies differential privacy, though the Laplace
mechanism is preferred as it’s mathematically cleaner [10].
However, there is a drawback to the Laplace mechanism in graph
datasets such as social networks [11, 12] or vehicle commuting
patterns. Even if a particular data owner does not participate, their
friends that do participate leak information that can be used to depri-
vatize the targeted data owner (e.g., shadow profiles). For example,
it is possible to learn political beliefs or sexual orientation even
if a particular individual does not participate and maintain an ac-
tive profile in an online social network. An adversary simply needs
to analyze the similarity metrics amongst the social circles that a
data owner participates in to understand politics beliefs or sexual
orientation [13–17].
Furthermore, if the graph structures of the social network are
eventually anonymized and released, an adversary simply needs to
participate and influence the graph structure (e.g., joining a social
network) to learn and influence the actual social graph before it’s
privatized and released. Thus, there needs to be a mechanism which
also perturbs the underlying structure of the data itself and preserves
accuracy as the underlying distribution structure becomes distorted.
Sampling whereby responses are randomly discarded reduces the
the graph dependencies leaked by a targeted individuals connections.
The severed connections reduces the social circle size and makes
it challenging for the adversary to make similarity inferences from
reduced social circles alone. Thus, it has been shown that the strength
of privacy mechanisms are increased by applying sampling and
reducing the privacy leakage [12, 18–20].
However, we are interested in more than extending existing pri-
vacy mechanisms. We ask can we achieve privacy by sampling alone?
Can sampling based plausible deniability be provided while simulta-
neously maintaining constant error as the population increases and
the underlying truthful population becomes distorted?
In this paper, we present the Sampling Privacy mechanism. Sam-
pling Privacy is a distributed sampling approach in which a data
owner answers with (contradictory) responses yet maintains con-
stant absolute error as the population increases and the truthful
distribution becomes distorted.
2 RELATED WORK
Privacy Definitions. Differential privacy [5, 6, 10, 21] has been
proposed as a privacy definition such that anything that can be
learned if a particular data owner is added to the database could
have also been learned before the data owner was added. A data
owner is thus “safe" to participate as statistical inferences amongst
the aggregate are learned yet specific information regarding the
individual is not learned.
Zero-knowledge privacy [11] is a cryptographically influenced
privacy definition that is strictly stronger than differential privacy.
Crowd-blending privacy [12] is weaker than differential privacy;
however, with a pre-sampling step, satisfies both differential privacy
and zero-knowledge privacy. However, these mechanisms are suited
for the centralized system model and rely on aggressive sampling,
which significant degrades the accuracy estimations.
Distributional privacy [22] is a privacy mechanism which says
that the released aggregate information only reveals the underlying
ground truth distribution and nothing morre. Each data owner is
protected by the randomness of the other randomly selected data
owners rather than by adding explicit privacy noise to the output.
The indistinguishability from the underlying distribution protects
individual data owners and is strictly stronger than differential pri-
vacy. However, it is computationally inefficient though can work
over a large class of queries known as Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC)
dimension.
Sampling. Sampling whereby a centralized aggregator randomly
discards responses has been previously formulated as a mechanism
to amplify privacy [12, 18–20, 23]. The intuition is that when sam-
pling approximates the original aggregate information, an attacker
is unable to distinguish when sampling is performed and which
data owners are sampled. These privacy mechanisms range from
sampling without a sanitization mechanism, sampling to amplify
a differentially private mechanism, sampling that tolerates a bias,
and even sampling a weaker privacy notion such as k-anonymity to
amplify the privacy guarantees.
However, sampling alone has several issues. First, data owners
are not protected by plausible deniability as data owners do not
respond “No". Second, the estimation of the underlying truthful
“Yes" responses quickly degrades as we increase the population that
truthfully responds “No".
Multi-party Computation. Multi-party computation (MPC) is a se-
cure computation model whereby parties jointly compute a function
such that each party only learns the aggregate output and nothing
more. However, MPC mechanisms that release the exact answer has
no strong privacy guarantees against active privacy attacks, partic-
ularly when the data is publicly published. A participant that does
not perturb their responses and provides their exact answer is easily
attacked by an adversary that knows the values of n−1 participants.
For example, an adversary first runs a counting query that includes
all n data owners and then runs a second counting query over n−1
data owners (the targeted data owner is the excluded row). Sub-
tracting the two results reveals the value of the targeted data owner.
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In contrast, the differential privacy model assumes a strong adver-
sary that knows the n−1 data owner values. There are attempts to
combine MPC and differential privacy, though these are outside the
scope of this paper.
3 TOY CONSTRUCTION
Let us first consider a simplistic sampling based privacy approach
and show that it has limitations, in particular it is not scalable as it
does not maintain constant error as the population increases. This
will motivate the introduction of a more sophisticated sampling
based scheme - the Sampling Privacy mechanism.
Consider a population whereby only 5% of the population satisfies
a particular attribute (for example at a particular location). These
5% of the population should truthfully respond “Yes" while the
remaining 95% subpopulation truthfully responds “No". We refer to
each subpopulation as Yespop and Nopop respectively.
It should be noted that the Yespop is fixed. That is, at a given time
instance the number of people physically at a particular location
is physically constrained. The query population is adjustable by
including those not at a particular location. Thus, only the Nopop
increases. Say, instead of querying only Manhattan vehicles about
presence in Times Square, we query all vehicles in New York State.
One approach is to grow the query population size by several orders
of magnitude.
For example, let’s ask a counting query of how many people are
currently at the Statue of Liberty. We then privately release the result
of this counting query privately to protect the personal data of each
data owner.
We could query only those physically at the Statue of Liberty
(Yespop). However, if we know that any particular data owner par-
ticipated in the query we know absolutely certain their location is
the Statue of Liberty. Thus, the privacy protection is quite limited
regardless of any perturbation performed for this particular query.
The privacy protection would be strengthened if we query every-
one in New York State. The additional data owners provide plausible
deniability by increasing the potential pool of candidates that some-
times respond “Yes" indicating they are at the Statue of Liberty.
Now, if we know that someone participated in the query all we can
immediately deduce is they are “somewhere" in New York State.
We now illustrate a toy construction of our sampling based privacy
scheme, showing that it overcomes simple sampling drawbacks. Our
goal is to increase the pool of candidates (e.g., in our example
those currently not at the Statue of Liberty) while simultaneously
maintaining constant error.
3.1 Threat Model
The attack: an adversary can utilize the database size (number of
participants) to deduce if a particular individual is included. However,
the exact population (database) size or exact number of participating
data owners is not published or released. This mitigates auxiliary
attacks whereby the adversary uses the exact counts to reconstruct
the database.
The attack: an adversary can individually inspect the responses
of each data owner to ascertain their truthful response. However, we
select sampling probabilities less than 50% so that an adversary does
not gain an inference advantage of greater than 50%. We also require
a distributed set of aggregators or trusted aggregator whereby at least
one aggregator does not collude with the others.
3.2 Sampling and Noise
Our first question is how to construct a mechanism such that those
that truthfully respond “No" to sometimes respond “Yes"? We could
leverage the Nopop population by having a subpopulation respond
“Yes”. To perform the final estimation we need to subtract the esti-
mated added noise. However, let us show more formally that sam-
pling and random noise alone does not work as there are more
unknown variables than equations.
(Sampling and Noise Response) Each data owner privatizes their
truthful value by performing the following Bernoulli trial. Let πs be
the sampling probability .
Privatized Value =

1 with probability πs
∅ with probability 1−πs
0 never
(1)
That is, each data owner is sampled uniformly at random to
respond “Yes". A sampled portion of the Yespop truthfully responds
“Yes". Privacy noise is provided by the sampled portion of the Nopop
which responds “Yes". The remaining population does not participate
and there is not a single data owner which responds “No".
It is not possible to estimate the underlying Yespop as our esti-
mator is an unsolvable system of equations with one equation (the
aggregated privatized count) and two unknowns (Yespop and Nopop).
The Yespop must somehow become distinguishable from the Nopop
in order to estimate the underlying population of those that truthfully
should respond “Yes". We also observe that there must be some
privacy leakage in order to have any notion of accuracy when the
underlying data is perturbed.
3.3 Sampling and Plausible Deniability
After the previous false starts, we now attempt to construct a mech-
anism for which we can estimate the underlying population and
for which plausible deniability is provided. That is, data owners
occassionally respond opposite to their truthful response based on
the resulting coin tosses.
(Sampling and Plausible Deniability Response) We now describe
how to achieve both sampling and plausible deniability below. There
are two separate protocols. One for those that truthfully respond
“Yes" . Conversely, another for those that truthfully respond “No".
The protocols are named Privatized ValueYes and Privatized ValueNo
respectively. The protocols are defined below.
(Privatization) Let πs be the sampling probability that determines
whether a data owner with data participates or not. We also use two
independent and biased coins. π1 and π2 refer to the first and second
biased coin toss respectively.
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Privatized ValueYes =

∅ with probability 1−πs
1 with probability
πs×π1 +1−π1×π2
0 otherwise
(2)
That is, a data owner responds “Yes" with probability πs×π1 +
1−π1×π2 from the Yespop subpopulation. They do not participate
with probability 1−πs. Otherwise they respond “No".
Privatized ValueNo =

∅ with probability 1−πs
1 with probability
πs×1−π1×π2
0 otherwise
(3)
That is, a data owner responds “Yes" with probability πs×1−
π1×π2 from the Nopop subpopulation. They do not participate with
probability 1−πs. Otherwise they respond “No".
We have plausible deniability protection as each data owner will
occasionally respond opposite to their truthful response. The total
amount of privacy noise is generated with probability πs×1−π1×
π2 from each subpopulation and needs to be removed in order to
perform estimation of the underlying truthful population as we show
below.
(Expected Values) We now formulate the expected values in order
to carry out the estimation. The expected value of those that respond
‘1’ (i.e., privatized “Yes") is the sum of the binomial distribution of
each subpopulation.
E1 = πs×π1×Yespop+
πs×1−π1×π2×Yespop +Nopop (4)
(Estimator) We solve for Yespop by the following. Let the aggre-
gated privatized counts be denoted as Private Sum.
Yespop =
Private Sum−πs×1−π1×π2×Yespop +Nopop
πs×π1 (5)
That is, we first subtract the expected value of the privacy noise.
We then divide by the sampling probability πs which determines
if a data owner with data participates. π1 is the sampling param-
eter which determines how frequently a data owner truthfully re-
sponds “Yes" from the Yespop subpopulation. It should be noted that
Equation 5 is precisely the structure of the randomized response
mechanism [7, 8].
Examining the structure of Equation 5 we make the following
observation. Increasing the Nopop population and correspondingly
reducing the underlying truthful percentage of the population to say
5% and below will induce large sampling error. Unfortunately, as
the Yespop is physically constrained and fixed (see Section 3), it is
the only population that can be scaled up.
We desire better calibration over the privacy mechanism and a
mechanism which maintains constant error as the Nopop population
scales up. We now introduce the Sampling Privacy mechanism.
Figure 1: (Location Discretization) Each location coordinate
(latitude,longitude) is discretized to a location identifier.
4 SAMPLING PRIVACY MECHANISM
We now describe the Sampling Privacy mechanism that achieves
constant error even as the population which truthfully responds
“No" (Nopop) increases. We motivate our example using location
coordinates, though the mechanism applies to all real valued data.
We describe the general mechanism and then formally describe it
below.
Suppose a data owner currently at the Eiffel Tower participates in
the protocol. First, the location is discretized to a location identifier
(ID) as seen in Figure 1. For example, using a 32 bit identifier
provides 4 billion possible locations, which covers a 9,500 x 9,500
mile square with 0.15 mile sections for a total of 90 million square
miles. For comparison Paris is 41 square miles, London is 607 square
miles, New York City is 305 square miles and Beijing is 6,336 square
miles [24]. In Figure 1 the Eiffel Tower corresponds to location ID
28.
Then, suppose the data owner at the Eiffel Tower is sampled and
selected. In the first round the selected data owner should respond
“No". The remaining data owners uniformly at random respond either
“Yes" or “No" regardless of their truthful response. The counts of
“Yes" and “No" are aggregated.
In the second round the selected data owner should respond “Yes".
The remaining data owners remain with their response in the first
round. The counts of “Yes" and “No" are aggregated.
Now, by subtracting the “Yes" counts of round one from round
two we can compute the sampled population count. Finally, dividing
the sampled population count by the sampling parameter computes
the estimated number of data owners currently at the Eiffel Tower.
There are three privacy points to observe. First, a majority of
the population provides privacy noise by uniformly at random re-
sponding either “Yes" or “No" regardless of their truthful response.
Second, plausible deniability is provided as each data owner prob-
abilistically responds opposite of their truthful response. Finally,
every data owner acts as a candidate for the truthful population. Our
assumption is that every data owner is active in both rounds and only
the aggregate counts are released.
We now formally describe the Sampling Privacy mechanism.
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4.1 Binary Value
We now formally describe the binary version of the Sampling Pri-
vacy mechanism whereby data owners respond either “No" or “Yes",
either 0 and 1, respectively. Following from the Eiffel Tower exam-
ple above, 0 refers to currently not at the Eiffel Tower and 1 refers
to currently at the Eiffel Tower.
(Round One) In the first round, the data owners flip a three sided die.
The three probabilities are π0, πs, and 1−π0−πs where π0 refers
to the probability of responding to the output 0, πs is the sampling
parameter which also responds to the output 0, and otherwise 1−
π0−πs is the probability to respond to the output 1. The first round
establishes the baseline used to estimate the count by having those
with the sampling probability assigned to output 0 corresponding to
“No".
Round One =

0 with probability π0
0 with probability πs
1 with probability 1−π0−πs
(6)
(Round Two) In the second round, we shift the sampled population
that truthfully respond “Yes" from 0 to 1. This shift of the subpopu-
lation allows us to estimate the underlying distribution as we will
see below.
Round TwoYes =

0 with probability π0
1 with probability πs
1 with probability 1−π0−πs
(7)
That is, the truthful “Yes" responses that responded “No" in the
first round now respond “Yes" in the second round.
The sampled population that truthfully respond “No" stays at 0.
The remaining data owners remain at their output chosen in round
one.
Round TwoNo =

0 with probability π0
0 with probability πs
1 with probability 1−π0−πs
(8)
The separate protocols for each subpopulation allows us to in-
crease the Nopop while retaining constant error.
(Expected Values) We now formulate the expected values as follows.
The subscript refers to the round number. That is, 01 refers to output
0, round 1. The first round of expected values for each output are:
E01 = π0×TOTALpop +πs×TOTALpop
E11 = 1−π0−πs×TOTALpop (9)
The second round of expected values for each output are:
E02 = π0×TOTALpop +πs×Nopop
E12 = 1−π0−πs×TOTALpop +πs×Yespop (10)
(Estimator) We solve for the Yespop population by subtracting
round two by round one as follows. Let Private Sum 01 refer to
the aggregated privatized counts for output 0, round 1.
Yespop =
Private Sum 12−Private Sum 11
πs
(11)
That is, we recover the sampled population by subtracting the pri-
vatized sum of the shifted output 1, round 1 from round 2 (Equations
6 and 7). Then we obtain the estimate by dividing by the sampling
parameter.
This mechanism constrains the sampling error to solely the Yespop
as seen by Equations 9 and 10. We are able to scale the Nopop yet
retain constant error. Plausible deniability is provided as each data
owner may respond “Yes" or “No" based on the coin toss parameters.
4.2 Multiple Values
We now examine how to privatize the multiple choice scenario
whereby there are multiple values and the data owner should select
a single value. We extend the binary value mechanism defined in the
previous section. Multiple values are applicable to most real-world
scenarios (as opposed to the binary value mechanism). The location
coordinate grid scenario, explained in Section 4 and illustrated in
Figure 1, explains a scenario where there are multiple locations (i.e.,
location IDs) and the data owner is currently at a single location ID.
Recall that the data owner’s truthful response is discretized to an
integer value greater than 0.
The number of values of the outputs should equal to the desired
number of values plus an output (used for baseline calibration in
the first round). For example, if there are 9 locations to monitor,
there should be a total of 10 output values, where 0 is the additional
output.
Let there be a total of V possible discretized output values (e.g.,
V possible locations). The total number of output values should then
be V + 2. Let V ′ be the truthful output value for a particular data
owner.
(Round One) The first round is similar to the first round of the
binary value mechanism. The data owner tosses a V + 1 sided die
with probabilities π0, π1,...,πV , and πs. That is, each data owner
uniformly at random selects an output independent of their truthful
value. However, a small sampling fraction writes to the output 0 (in
order to baseline the values used for estimation).
Round One =

0 with probability π0
0 with probability πs
1 with probability π1
2 with probability π2
...
V with probability
1−π0−π1− ...−πV −πs
(12)
(Round Two) In the second round, the sampled data owners that
flipped πs now choose their truthful output value V ′. The remaining
data owners stay at the output chosen in round one.
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Round Two =

0 with probability π0
1 with probability π1
2 with probability π2
...
V ′ with probability πv′
V′ with probability πs
...
V with probability
1−π0−π1− ...−πV −πs
(13)
This step allows us to estimate the underlying truthful distribution.
(Expected Values) The expected values are as follows.
The first round of expected values are as follows. The output 0
includes the fraction of the population which is randomly assigned to
output 0. Additionally, the sampled populations of those that answer
“Yes" truthfully at each output are initially assigned to output 0 in
the first round. This serves as the baseline to perform estimation as
we will see after the second round.
E01 = π0×TOTAL+πs× V
n=1
Yespop,n
E11 = π1×TOTAL
E21 = π2×TOTAL
...
EV1 = πV ×TOTAL
(14)
The second round of expected values are as follows. The sampled
population is assigned to their truthful output V ′. The remaining data
owners stay at the output assigned in round one.
E02 = π0×TOTAL
E12 = π1×TOTAL
E22 = π2×TOTAL
...
EV ′2 = πV ′ ×TOTAL+πs×Yespop
...
EV2 = πV ×TOTAL
(15)
(Estimator) We iterate over each output 1...V and solve for each
output V ′ by subtracting round two by round one as follows:
Yespop,V ′ =
Private Sum V ′2−Private Sum V ′1
πs
(16)
4.3 Privacy Guarantee
The Sampling Privacy mechanism satisfies differential privacy as we
show in this section. We first examine the binary value mechanism
and then the multiple values mechanism.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy has become the gold stan-
dard privacy mechanism which ensures that the output of a sani-
tization mechanism does not violate the privacy of any individual
inputs.
Definition 4.1 ([5, 6]). (ε-Differential Privacy). A privacy mech-
anism San provides ε-differential privacy if, for all datasets D1 and
D2 differing on at most one record (i.e., the Hamming distance H is
HD1,D2 ≤ 1), and for all outputs O⊆ RangeSan:
sup
D1,D2
PrSanD1 ∈ O
PrSanD2 ∈ O ≤ expε (17)
That is, the probability that a privacy mechanism San produces
a given output is almost independent of the presence or absence of
any individual record in the dataset. The closer the distributions are
(i.e., smaller ε), the stronger the privacy guarantees become and vice
versa. That is, a larger ε means that the two dataset distribution are
far apart and leaks more information. A single record will induce
distinguishable output fluctuations. We desire smaller ε values to
induce ε indistinguishability.
4.4 Differential Privacy Guarantee
(Binary Value) The differential privacy leakage is measured as the
maximum ratio of the binary output given the underlying truthful
answer is “Yes" and “No" respectively.
In round one, there is no privacy leakage as both output 0 and
1 are both equally likely and indistinguishable given the truthful
answer is either “No" or “Yes" respectively. Thus, we analyze the
privacy leakage in round two.
For output 0, round 2 (02) the privacy leakage is as follows:
εDP = max
(
ln
(Pr02|“Yes”
Pr02|“No”
)
, ln
( Pr02|“No”
Pr02|“Yes”
))
(18)
Pr02|“Yes”
Pr02|“No” =
π0 +πs
π0
(19)
Pr02|“No”
Pr02|“Yes” =
π0
π02 +πs
(20)
εDP = max
(
ln
(π0 +πs
π0
)
, ln
( π0
π0 +πs
))
(21)
For output 1, round 2 (12) the privacy leakage is as follows:
εDP = max
(
ln
(Pr12|“Yes”
Pr12|“No”
)
, ln
( Pr12|“No”
Pr12|“Yes”
))
(22)
Pr12|“Yes”
Pr12|“No” =
1−π0
1−π0−πs (23)
Pr12|“No”
Pr12|“Yes” =
1−π0−πs
1−π0 (24)
εDP = max
(
ln
( 1−π0
1−π0−πs
)
, ln
(1−π0−πs
1−π0
))
(25)
(Multiple Values) The differential privacy leakage is measured as
the maximum ratio of the multiple output given the underlying
truthful answer is any combination of two values of the output of
size V .
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In round one, there is no privacy leakage as every output is indis-
tinguishable and equally likely given the truthful answer is any of
the output. In round two, for any two outputs whereby a data owner
would not truthfully output these values, the outputs are indistin-
guishable and there is no privacy leakage.
The only privacy leakage occurs when the data owner truthfully
responds for output V’, round two. Without loss of generality, let
the data owners truthful output be V’ which can take on any value of
the output from 1...V . Let a data owner’s output which is not their
truthful value is ¬V ′ as opposed to their truthful value of V ′.
εDP = max
(
ln
( PrV ′2|V ′
PrV ′2|¬V ′
)
, ln
(PrV ′|¬V ′
PrV ′|V ′
))
(26)
PrV ′2|V ′
PrV ′2|¬V ′
=
πV ′ +πs
πV ′
(27)
PrV ′2|¬V ′
PrV ′2|V ′
=
πV ′
πV ′ +πs
(28)
εDP = max
(
ln
(πV ′ +πs
πV ′
)
, ln
( πV ′
πV ′ +πs
))
(29)
The additional output of 0 for the multiple value scenario reduces
the leakage opportunities as compared to the binary value scenario.
5 EVALUATION
Our evaluation examines the question of accuracy and privacy leak-
age. How well does the Sampling Privacy mechanism estimation
error scale as the population that truthfully responds “No" increases?
How well does the Sampling Privacy mechanism compare to the
Randomized Response mechanism for both accuracy and privacy
leakge?
5.1 Accuracy
(Gowalla) We evaluate over the Gowalla dataset [25, 26]. Gowalla
was a location-based social network where users check-in to popu-
lar places (e.g., restaurants, cafes, tourist attractions) and establish
social networks connections. Our evaluation is over New York City.
Each checkin contains a location coordinate (latitude, longitude)
and location ID which maps to a unique check-in location. For our
purposes we use the location ID as specified by Gowalla.
Figure 2 compares the Sampling Privacy mechanism with the Ran-
domized Response and the ground truth using the Gowalla dataset.
We show four distinct check-in locations (rather than all locations
for ease of illustration). There are over one million check-ins across
all the locations. H Privacy 1 has a sampling parameter of 45% and
H Privacy 2 has a sampling parameter of 25%. The Randomized
Response mechanism has parameters f lip1 = 0.8 and f lip2 = 0.2.
Each bar in the graph represents the absolute error from the ground
truth with a 95% confidence bound.
The randomized response mechanism has from 1.6 to 3.5 times
higher worst case error bound as compared to the Sampling Pri-
vacy mechanism. The Randomized Response sampling error is due
to the second coin toss sampling error as described in Section 3.2.
Sampling Privacy is able to maintain a significantly lower error
bound due to the estimation calibration in each round as described
in Section 4.
(Breast Cancer) Next, we evaluate over the Breast Cancer Dataset [27,
28]. The dataset contains 286 breast cancer patient attributes (10
total attributes such as age, tumor size, menopause). For our evalua-
tion we select the attributes of recurrence, age, and tumor size. The
dataset publishes these attributes as ranges. That is, ages are grouped
“10− 19”,“20− 29”, ...,“90− 99”. Tumor sizes are grouped “0−
4”,“5− 9”, ....,“55− 59”. Each group is assigned an integer iden-
tifier. The integers are assigned in increasing order (i.e., “10−19”
is group 1, “20−29” is group 2, etc). H Privacy 1 has a sampling
parameter of 45%. The Randomized Response mechanism has pa-
rameters f lip1 = 0.8 and f lip2 = 0.2.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 evaluates the absolute error with a 95%
confidence bound whereby we privatize only the attributes of each
patient, such as age and tumor size. However, an adversary that
knows that a particular patient was involved in the published data set
knows definitively that the particular data owner has breast cancer.
Thus, we need to increase the non-cancer population.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 evaluates the absolute error with a 95%
confidence bound whereby we increase the query population from
286 to 10,000 data owners (the number of non-cancer data owners is
9714). The Randomized Response quickly grows in absolute error
due to the sampling error while Sampling Privacy maintains constant
error.
5.2 Privacy
We now examine the privacy leakage of the Sampling Privacy mech-
anism. Figure 3 evaluates the privacy leakage comparing the Sam-
pling Privacy mechanism and the Randomized Response mechanism.
Sampling Privacy uses the privacy guarantee equation defined in
Equation 29 to measure the privacy leakage. The privacy guarantee
equation for the Randomized Response mechanism privacy leakage
details can be found in Appendix A.
The coin toss parameters used in Figure 3 has Randomized Re-
sponse f lip1 = 0.8. The x-axis varies the second coin toss heads
success probability π2. The privacy leakage decreases as the privacy
noise is increased (by increasing the second coin toss head success
probability). However, more privacy noise is added as the cost of
accuracy.
The Sampling Privacy mechanism uses a sampling parameter
of 0.45. As we will see we will maintain lower privacy leakage as
compared to the randomized response mechanism. The x-axis refers
to the con toss heads success probability for the truthful response
π⊥V ′ . Increasing this coin toss heads success probability increases
the amount of privacy leakage as the distance of the honest responses
and privatized responses grows larger.
The red circles correspond to the coin toss head success probabil-
ities used in the dataset evaluation in Section 5.1. We could increase
the randomized response second coin toss π2 probability to decrease
the privacy leakage at the cost of increased absolute error.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the Sampling Privacy Mechanism and
show how to achieve differential privacy in the distributed setting
by sampling alone. We show that we can maintain constant error
(i.e., absolute error from the ground truth) even as the population
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increases and achieve a as much as four times lower privacy leakage
as compared to randomized response.
A RANDOMIZED RESPONSE PRIVACY
GUARANTEE
A.0.1 Privacy Guarantee of Randomized Response. The
randomized response mechanism achieves ε-differential privacy,
where:
ε = max
(
ln
(PrResp=‘Yes’ |‘Yes’
PrResp=‘Yes’ |‘No’
)
, ln
( PrResp=‘Yes’ |‘No’
PrResp=‘Yes’ |‘Yes’
))
More specifically, the randomized response mechanism [8] achieves
ε-differential privacy, where:
ε = ln
(π1 +1−π1×π2
1−π1×π2
)
(30)
That is, if a data owner has the sensitive attribute A, then the
randomized answer will be “Yes” with the probability of ‘π1 +1−
π1×π2’. Else, if a data owner does not have the sensitive attribute,
then the randomized answer will become “Yes” with the probability
of ‘1−π1×π2’.
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